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SEPTEMBER 1 1TH, A CITIZEN'S RESPONSES (CONTINUED)
George Anastaplo t
Introduction
This article is the law review sequel to a two-hundred page series of responses
to the September 1lth crisis published by me in the Oklahoma City University
Law Review in 2004.1 That collection includes thirteen essays commenting (di-
rectly or indirectly) on developments following upon the assaults in 2001 on New
York City and Washington, D.C. Those essays (of 2001-2002) offered assess-
ments of events as they developed, beginning with my talk on September 12,
2001. These thirteen essays were preceded in that series by three letters to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (on September 12, 13, and 17, 2001) and were
followed by fifty-two letters to newspaper editors (from 1997-2003), and by
three appendices providing background discussions.
A critical aspect of my periodic discussion of American responses to the Sep-
tember 1 th challenge has been an awareness of how the United States has come
to be regarded worldwide. It is obvious that considerable sympathy for Ameri-
cans was at once evoked everywhere because of the shocking attacks in 2001.
Also obvious, however, has been a steady deterioration since then in the stand-
ing of the United States in the estimation of international public opinion. This is,
in large part, it seems, because of the determinedly unilateralist manner in which
we have conducted ourselves, especially with respect to Iraq. General Colin
Powell, upon denouncing the harsh interrogations of terrorism-related prisoners
that the Administration has insisted upon, observed, "The world is beginning to
doubt the moral basis of our fight against terrorism."'2 How we are regarded by
others may affect the level and kind of cooperation that the United States can
expect to secure from other peoples and their governments in the effort to antici-
pate the plots of "terrorists." That ever more cooperation may be needed in the
years ahead is suggested by an assessment, in a classified National Intelligence
Estimate report completed in April 2006, that the American invasion and occupa-
tion of Iraq have helped spawn a new generation of Islamic radicals and that the
overall terrorist threat has grown since the September 1 th attacks.
It remains to be seen what lessons we have taught other peoples about the
legitimacy of preemptive warfare, lessons that can be particularly ominous when
t George Anastaplo is Professor of Law at Loyola University Chicago; Professor Emeritus of
Political Science and of Philosophy, Rosary College (now Dominican University); and Lecturer in the
Liberal Arts, The University of Chicago. He received his PhD, 1964, J.D., 1951, and A.B., 1948 at the
University of Chicago.
I See George Anastaplo, September Eleventh, The ABC's of a Citizen's Responses, 29 OKLA. Crrv
U. L. REV. 165 (2004). The editors of the Loyola University Chicago International Law Review have
added footnotes to this 2007 article indicating the dates when the original remarks were given and pro-
viding citations to materials referred to where appropriate.
2 See Anne Plummer Flaherty, Panel Defies Bush on Terror Trials: 4 GOP Senators Back Measure
President Vows to Block, CHI. SUN TIMES, Sept. 15, 2006, at A22.
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one or more of the parties involved in quarrels during the coming decades pos-
sess nuclear weapons. The extent to which effective international law depends
on mutual respect and a shared "moral basis" is now being put to a grim test.
The perhaps unprecedented unpopularity these days of the United States as an
actor on the world stage may seem inconsistent with the continuing efforts made
by multitudes of foreigners to get into this country to work and to live. But the
hostility that is now worldwide does seem to be directed primarily at our Na-
tional Administration-and not only because of what it does abroad, but also
because of how it routinely justifies itself (including the cavalier way it has dealt
with the venerable writ of habeas corpus).
The thirteen essays published in 2004 recorded my periodic assessments of
events through the first two years of the September 1 lth challenge. Subsequent
assessments, of the third, fourth, and fifth years of the September 11 th challenge,
are collected here, along with general observations in 2005 about an unseemly
fearfulness among us-assessments that see in our fearfulness with respect to
"terrorism" too much of the European dread of witchcraft four centuries ago.
This 2007 collection includes remarks made by me after the November 2006
Mid-term Congressional Elections.
A. The September 11th Challenge in Its Third Year: Lessons in
Citizenship 3
Prologue
No one can accuse us of engaging in a mere "academic" exercise when we
consider this morning, in Martin Marty's seminar on religion and its conse-
quences, the significance of the American people's responses to the monstrous
attacks of September 11 th. This exercise is obviously in marked contrast to what
we are doing in my parallel seminar this week on the Tao school of thought in
ancient China.
Reinforcing the sense of the practical importance of our "September 11 th"
inquiry on this occasion is the recognition that Wisconsin is regarded as "a Bat-
tleground State" during the current Presidential election contest. My own State,
Illinois, is not so regarded, which can mean that we, at least for the time being,
may not approach these matters as seriously as you do up here.
The range of political interests and possibilities in Wisconsin is suggested by
the recollection that the names of politicians as diverse in character and talent as
the LaFollettes and Joseph McCarthy should be so prominent in this State's his-
tory. The range of possibilities suggested by this juxtaposition of "iconic"
figures can license the citizen who is not himself in public life to address issues
in a way that might be difficult, if not even improper, for the practicing politician
to deal with directly.
3 These remarks, of August 18, 2004, were prepared for a seminar conducted by Martin E. Marty of
the University of Chicago, at Lawrence University's Bjorklunden Center in Door County, Wisconsin.
The preliminary publication of these remarks was in GREEK STAR, Sept. 16, 2004, at 8.
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But whatever one's station in the community, one should not attempt to deal
with September 11 th matters without recognizing that nothing one can say is
likely to deal adequately with the profound sense of loss and with the enduring
pain of those who lost loved ones in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania
on that fateful day three years ago.
It can be salutary to begin my remarks by adding something to what Professor
Marty, in his examination this week of the use and abuse of religion, has said
about that memorable Churchman, Pope John XXIII. It is reported that he was
once asked, "How many people work at the Vatican?" His answer, "About half
of them."
His sense of humor probably contributed to the appeal he has long had for
many, both in his Church and out. That appeal is reflected in what one can see
upon visiting the crypt below St. Peter's where the tombs of recent Popes may be
found. For years now, the tomb of John XXIII has been apt to have more flowers
and other signs of spontaneous public affection left on it than may be seen on all
of the other nearby papal tombs combined.
There is suggested, by this Pope's sense of humor, an openness to the humane
that can reflect, in turn, one's sense of proportion as a leader.
II
Three stories can help me prepare the ground for the assessment I have been
asked to provide of the public response in the United States to the September
11 th attacks.
The first of these stories takes us back to an encounter I had, more than thirty
years ago, with Daniel Ellsberg of Pentagon Papers notoriety. We were on a
Chicago television program during a recess in his trial for having distributed, to
unauthorized recipients, sets of the massive Top Secret documents discussing the
involvement of this country in the Vietnam War.
I ventured to suggest, on our program, that Mr. Ellsberg would never spend a
night in jail because of what he had done. He was startled to hear what I had
said, adding that his wife would be glad to hear such a prediction. He then won-
dered why his lawyers had never talked to him this way. That, I suggested, is
because his lawyers were on the East and West Coasts. We here in the Midwest,
I further explained, are much more moderate about such matters.
It is a thoroughgoing moderation that can be useful in thinking about our Sep-
tember 11 th problems. (It turned out, by the way, that my encouraging prediction
about Mr. Ellsberg's fate proved to be correct.4 )
4 See National Public Radio, Moral Aspects of Leaking Top Secret Government Documents (Radio
broadcast Feb. 25, 2004) (indicating that criminal charges against Daniel Ellsberg were dismissed in
1973 due to government misconduct).
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III
The second of my stories is about a talk I gave to law students in Chicago
during the week immediately before the September 11 th attacks. I lamented on
that occasion the abysmal passivity of airline passengers that I had happened to
observe (and even to challenge) on our flight, over the preceding Labor Day
weekend, to the American Political Science Association Convention in San
Francisco.
Of course, I did not anticipate the deadly hijackings that would take place a
few days after my talk. But the murderous hijackers very much relied upon such
passivity, something which they were effective in ruthlessly exploiting in three of
the four flights they commandeered on September 11. It seems that the passen-
gers on the fourth targeted flight were shocked enough out of their usual passiv-
ity, evidently because of what they had heard on their cell phones, to interfere
substantially with what the hijackers were trying to do with their plane.
It is unfortunate for the hijackers that all of them were not similarly thwarted.
After all, it soon became evident that the monstrous deeds of the hijackers were
not truly in the long-term interests of their causes-nor, of course, in their natural
interests as decent human beings.
IV
I have suggested, with my story about Daniel Ellsberg, how people with "lib-
eral" inclinations could be led astray in their fears by Cold War passions. My
third story, to which I now turn, suggests how people with "conservative" incli-
nations could also be led astray by Cold War passions.
Our family enjoyed, in 1960, a six-month, seventeen-thousand-mile camping
trip by automobile across Europe, which included time for a fortnight in the So-
viet Union. What we saw, in our drive from Minsk and Smolensk to Moscow
and Leningrad (on our way over to Helsinki and thereafter to the Arctic Circle),
made it obvious that the Russians were condemned, at least in their everyday
lives, to a crippled economy. This placed a severe limit, in the long run, upon
how many resources could be diverted by them to their military forces and to
worldwide activities.
All this was dramatized for us by the chance loss, in Poland, of one of our two
car keys. This led to our repeated efforts, in one Russian city after another, to
have a duplicate made of our remaining key, something that could easily have
been done in any five-and-ten-cents store in an American small town at that time.
Our efforts were unsuccessful, however much the Intourist people we consulted
tried to help us. Of course, if we had been permitted to visit a Russian missile
base, something could probably have been done for us. But that would not have
told us anything about the soundness of the civilian economy upon which the
Russian military ultimately depended.
Misapprehensions about the strength, moral as well as material, of the Soviet
Union and its supposed allies contributed to our determination to go to war in
Vietnam, an ill-conceived intervention which cost us more than fifty thousand
lives and which cost the Vietnamese perhaps as many as a million lives.
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V
Would we have prepared better for our Vietnamese deliberations if those mak-
ing the decision had personally shared the costs? By and large, however, the
influential families that supported that war did not consider themselves obliged to
put their own sons at risk.
That is, family influence and clever manipulations of the system were used to
permit the avoidance of combat service by those who were quite willing to have
others conscripted to fight a dubious war. It would once have been taken for
granted that young men willing to shift risks in this way to the less privileged, in
a war they supported, should never thereafter be authorized to send other young
men to war.
VI
Indeed, it would have once been considered shameless for such shirkers, years
later, to have permitted their partisans to question publicly the patriotism of
others who had been willing to put themselves at risk. It should be remembered
here that our most recent ex-President also avoided wartime military service-
but in a war that he did not want anyone conscripted for. (He of course exhib-
ited, and suffered from, his own form of shamelessness.)
If the disparagement of another's war service, in our circumstances, can
"safely" be done, on behalf of calculating shirkers in high offices, then we should
face up to what this suggests about the debasement of public morale in this
country.
VII
Has the shock of "September 11 th" blunted our sensibilities here and else-
where? This is suggested by the magnitude of the casualties we are willing to
inflict on others, at relatively little cost in lives to ourselves. In this, we are in
danger of imitating the September 11 th organizers who were willing to sacrifice a
score of their own people in order to kill thousands of ours.
We are properly troubled by the steady losses we have indeed suffered in Iraq
since "Mission Accomplished" was proclaimed. But how should we regard our
now-routine killing there of dozens, if not even of hundreds, of "them" (combat-
ants and non-combatants alike) for every soldier we lose? Little if anything is
said about this in our press or by responsible leaders among us.
And yet, such a lack of public concern for an appropriate proportionality
makes it far harder for us to help ensure a sound world opinion about the "un-
thinkability" of various spectacular misdeeds. It is upon a humane world opinion
that we must depend in the long run, if we are to be reliably safe. To proceed
otherwise is to reveal that we do not truly know what we are doing.
Volume 4, Issue I Loyola University Chicago International Law Review 139
A Citizen's Response
Viii
Another symptom of the debasement of public morale in this country may be
seen in the unseemly sense of vulnerability, at the hands of would-be "terrorists,"
that we see promoted among ourselves.
This sense of vulnerability is reflected in, and is often intensified by, the wide-
ranging measures taken by us to protect ourselves in these circumstances. Our
measures include enormous expenditure that could be put to far better uses by a
community properly informed as to what is likely to enhance an enduring
security.
IX
None of us would want to deny the dreadfulness of the deliberate September
1 lth assaults which did cost four thousand lives. But we should not permit our-
selves to forget the "killings" among us that we have long permitted annually, on
a much grander scale, the "killings" for which the ingenious purveyors of alco-
hol, of tobacco, of ever more lethal automobiles, of guns, and of narcotics are in
large part responsible.
It should be evident that a small fraction of the resources devoted to Homeland
Security, if used instead for routine health and safety measures, would save many
more than four thousand lives annually in the United States. An informed hard-
headedness, on the part of the community at large, is called for here. Also called
for is a sober recognition of the fact that we are indeed mortal, no matter what
may be done on our behalf by our most conscientious public servants.
Too much of our response to the September 11 th challenge has both drawn
upon and promoted an unbecoming sentimentality. Where among us have been
the public men and women who have tried to remind us of what we have long
known about "the human condition"? The proper stories remain to be told here,
thereby putting who and where we are in the proper context. The distortion, if
not even the corruption, of our inherited religious sensibilities may be seen in
how we speak of ourselves these days.
X
Much of what has been done among us in response to the September 11 th
assaults reflects a lack of serious thought. It is still not generally recognized, for
example, how much of a fluke the "success" of the September 11 th operations
were. (This is aside from the significance of our earlier failure to secure airliner
cockpits from takeover by passengers, something which had evidently been
warned against well before September 2001. Such takeovers of cockpits can be
reliably prevented at relatively little cost hereafter, however difficult, if not im-
possible, it will always be to keep airliners from being knocked out of the sky.)
A former student of mine has become an internationally-recognized expert on
arms-control. He and I have argued, for more than a decade now, about the
usefulness, in our circumstances, of our proposed Missile Shield Program. That
is, I have long believed that the available resources here are much better used in
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programs to head off attacks by way of "suitcase" nuclear weapons, of bacterio-
logical releases, and of chemical and radioactive discharges.
An imaginative use of our resources is called for here as elsewhere. A healthy
response to the risks we face and the losses we may suffer depends, in part, upon
our informed awareness of our limitations both as human beings and as commu-
nities. It should not be forgotten, for example, how modest the preparations were
that culminated in the dreadful Oklahoma City bombing a decade ago.
XI
The informed hardheadedness called for in these matters is made less likely
when there is irresponsible political exploitation of our sense of vulnerability, an
exploitation that it is up to an informed citizenry to curtail. Matters are made
even worse when our government insists upon foreign policy initiatives that are
likely to sacrifice the longstanding goodwill of people everywhere toward the
United States.
Even the most powerful nations rely, for their continuing security and prosper-
ity, upon the promotion generally of reliable opinions about what is unthinkable.
For example, it hardly helps, in the proper efforts worldwide to contain nuclear-
warfare risks, for us to announce that we propose to develop a new generation of
specialized nuclear weapons. 5 Our seriousness, as well as our good faith, can be
called into question by these antics.
XII
Such antics can even come to seem bizarre when it is noticed how we have
conducted ourselves toward the apparently insane North Korean tyranny during
the past three years.
For some time we insisted, without sufficient reliable evidence, that Iraq had
Weapons of Mass Destruction that immediately threatened our security. At the
same time, and down to this day, we have insisted that we need not take any-
where near as seriously the threats posed to regional peace by the desperate
North Korean regime.
Thus, nothing that the Iraqi tyrants might say or do could assure us, while
nothing that the North Korean tyrants might do or say could alarm us, even when
they seem to be trying to develop nuclear weapons.
One can be moved to wonder sometimes whether there are any "grown-ups" in
charge of our affairs.
XIII
We can also be moved to wonder, when we encounter hostile measures di-
rected against us, "Why do they hate us?"
Part of the answer (at times, most if not all of the answer) lies in the limita-
tions and delusions that "they" suffer from. But part of the answer does depend
5 See, e.g., Pamela Hess, Pentagon Making Case for New Nukes, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Apr. 1, 2004.
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at times on what we are-on our virtues and accomplishments as well as on our
vices and failures (including mistaken foreign policy initiatives).
Among the grievances of the September 11 th organizers is said to have been
the resentment among them that there should be infidel military personnel sta-
tioned on the sacred soil of Saudi Arabia (We can be reminded here of the relig-
ious passions that Professor Marty has been examining this week). After the
First Gulf War, I myself argued that we should insist that Saudi Arabia and Ku-
wait prepare to defend themselves against future regional threats. After all, their
human and material resources do match those of any likely aggressor.
Even so, we should be cautious about reliance on simplistic diagnoses. No
doubt, the intrusion by us in Saudi Arabia has become more intense during the
past decade-but it is not as new as it sometimes seems to be made out to be.
Indeed, the last airbase at which I personally was stationed, at the end of the
Second World War, did happen to be at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. I particularly
recall both the intense daytime heat, even in winter, and the remarkable pastries
conjured up for the officers' mess by our amiable Italian prisoners of war.
Epilogue
Thus, in small matters as well as in large, "the world" has changed far less
than some among us sometimes "like" to believe.
It should not be forgotten that we, a nation of more than a quarter of a billion
people (compared to the mere one hundred and thirty million of my youth), re-
main the most powerful military and economic power in the known history of the
earth. We are at our most powerful when we use our strength sensibly-and are
generally perceived to do so.
Those of us who have been studying in my own seminar this week the Tao
school of thought have come to appreciate how difficult, if not virtually impossi-
ble, it can be for us in the West to understand a country such as China. Much the
same, we are learning, can be said about "countries" such as Iraq.
However all this may be, we cannot reasonably assess and deal with others
properly if we do not know ourselves. I have, on this occasion here in Wiscon-
sin, touched upon the articles of faith that we, as a self-governing people, should
take into account, especially as we confront (and not only during election years)
official and mass media manipulations of our hopes and fears.
In short, we are not destined to remain a self-governing community if we are
not as well a self-respecting people, a condition which should be significantly
promoted by disciplined religious sensibilities that have stood the test of time.
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B. The September 11th Challenge in Its Fourth Year: What Are the
Long-Term Risks? 6
We have now completed the fourth year of our responses to the monstrous
attacks upon American targets on September 11, 2001.
Those responses by the United States began with the campaign in Afghanistan
against the Taliban regime which was identified as the harborer of the al Qaeda
organization evidently responsible for the September 11 th atrocities. Once nomi-
nal control of Afghanistan was secured by us, the attention of Washington shifted
to Iraq, a regime that Administration strategists had evidently been concerned
about well before September 11th.7
The American campaign against the Saddam Hussein regime began mostly
with charges about the illicit development there of Weapons of Mass Destruction
and ended with an invasion of Iraq that quickly toppled its rulers. This cam-
paign, sometimes disparaged by critics as a "War of Choice," was largely a uni-
lateral initiative by the United States, with the United Nations not relied upon for
support, however many United Nations resolutions were invoked in justifying an
armed intervention by the Coalition directed by the United States.
Some complaints have been heard about the Iraqi campaign being a costly
diversion from the challenges in Afghanistan and of "the War on Terror." Cer-
tainly, the Iraqi Intervention has, during the past two years, required the bulk of
our overseas military resources in our effort to show the people of the Middle
East the workings and advantages of democratic regimes. Supporters of the cur-
rent Administration in Washington explain that the sacrifices now being made by
Americans will contribute significantly to the civilizing of regimes everywhere,
thereby helping to make life safer for the United States, even as it serves the
cause of justice worldwide. Whatever the debate may be as to whether the re-
gime of Saddam Hussein had anything to do with the September 11 th attacks,
there can be no serious debate as to whether that now-defunct regime had long
been barbaric.
II
Critics of the Administration, on the other hand, insist that the United States is
now "bogged down" in Iraq, unable to suppress what seems to be a growing
insurgency, with ominous prospects of a dreadful civil war when, if not even
before, we are finally obliged to leave. Such critics are particularly distressed by
what they consider the remarkable incompetence of the Administration in prepar-
ing for and thereafter in conducting the Occupation of Iraq.
6 These remarks, of September 19, 2005, were prepared for a conference on Law and the Iraq
Intervention held at the Loyola University Chicago School of Law, Chicago, Illinois. The preliminary
publication of these remarks was in GREEK STAR, Nov. 24, 2005, at 3.
7 See, e.g., Glenn Kessler, U.S. Decision on Iraq Has Puzzling Past, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2003 at
AO1.
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The continued vulnerability of American personnel in Iraq troubles everyone
on the Home Front, especially as even the critics of the Administration have no
obviously workable solutions for the problems we now face in that "country."
Both staying and leaving are seen as highly questionable courses of action for the
United States.
Unfavorable judgments about the competence and reliability of the current
Administration in Washington have been intensified by how the Hurricane Ka-
trina disasters in this country have been dealt with by federal emergency authori-
ties. The President has been portrayed as out of touch with "reality," so much so
(it is said) that far less than half of the public support his handling of the current
American-led Coalition effort in Iraq. It is even asked whether all this had been
"bound to happen" because of the personal interests, the intellectual presupposi-
tions, and the ideological orientation of the most influential figures in the Admin-
istration. Particularly puzzling to some is the impression that the country is not
being asked to make sacrifices (such as increased taxes) despite the troubles be-
ing endured at home as well as abroad.
But it should be noticed that the puzzles here are not only American. After all,
the Tony Blair Administration in Great Britain, now facing terrorist attacks on its
own soil, has long seemed to be an enthusiastic supporter of the Bush Adminis-
tration in its determination both to topple Saddam Hussein and to democratize
Iraq and its neighbors.
III
The immediate prospects in Iraq are uncertain-and solutions for the problems
faced there remain highly debatable. This debate is affected somewhat by the
doubts that continue to exist as to whether Saddam Hussein ever posed a substan-
tial threat to the United States. Some argue, indeed, that more anti-American
"terrorists" have been produced by our Iraqi Intervention than ever existed in the
entire Middle East before.
Somehow or other, of course, the United States will weather this storm. But
the truly grave risk is that our Iraqi experience, reinforced by our Vietnamese and
Somalian experiences, will make Americans hereafter far less likely than they
perhaps should be to undertake military missions on behalf of liberty and justice.
Thus, genocidal campaigns, which are a disgrace for mankind to permit, may
continue to run unchecked by the world community.
IV
At the heart of our own needs in the years ahead is a robust world opinion.
The Declaration of Independence, it should be remembered, could speak of a
duty to respect "the Opinions of Mankind." But the impression was left, by the
way the United States went to war in Iraq this time around, that we really did not
care much what world opinion was on this occasion.
Fundamental to all this may be our understanding of what law, domestic as
well as international, depends upon. Law does not depend, as some legal realists
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among us argue, only upon an exercise of power.8 This is an argument critical,
for example, to the justification for the dubious ruling in 1938 by the United
States Supreme Court in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.9 (Consider, also,
Thrasymachus' position in the first book of Plato's Republic.)
Particularly ominous can be our Government's apparent willingness to circum-
vent the law, whether domestic law or international law, in order to promote its
policies. Thus, an American citizen, born in New York and arrested in Chicago,
has been held for years as "an enemy combatant" without any charges or trial.
Lawyers who see this kind of detention permitted by our courts might well won-
der what has become of habeas corpus, that ancient guarantee which could once
be spoken of by Judge Blackstone as "a second Magna Carta."10
Be all this as it may, one consequence of the unilateralism exhibited by the
United States in Iraq seems to have been not only to generate more "Islamic
terrorists" but also to encourage questionable regimes to develop nuclear weap-
ons in order to discourage American interventions. Thus, it can be said, the Iraqi
campaign may have made the United States and its Coalition members even more
vulnerable than they might otherwise have been.
V
We have seen before, in this country, the risks run whenever high-minded
military measures come to be suspected. A conscientious citizen body can be
made more cautious than is good either for the country or for humanity.
This may especially be seen in the run-up, in 1939-1941, to the American
entrance into the Second World War. Critics of President Roosevelt's efforts to
sustain Great Britain against the Nazi regime were quite effective for some time.
Particularly instructive for me, because of my longtime admiration for the edu-
cator who dominated my college days, is the January 1941 speech for neutrality
by Robert M. Hutchins, the two-decades-long President of the University of Chi-
cago. He was, I venture to say, simply wrongheaded in the counsel that he gave
the country in 1940-1941, counsel which did not sufficiently appreciate what the
survival of Great Britain meant not only to us, but also to decent regimes world-
wide. His counsel found much, if not most, of the Country quite sympathetic at
that time to an isolationist stance by the United States.
VI
How, we may well wonder, did someone as intelligent, well-informed, and
sophisticated as Mr. Hutchins get to be as wrongheaded as I believe he was about
8 See generally JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005);
Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915 (2005) (present-
ing legal realism from a historical perspective).
9 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
10 BLACKSTONE, WILLIAM, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, Vol. 5, Amendment IX, Doc-
ument I (University of Chicago Press 1979) ("And by the habeas corpus act, 31 Car. II, c. 2. (that second
magna carta, and stable bulwark of our liberties.")), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/
documents/amendlXs I .html.
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the threat posed even to the United States by the Nazis in 1941? (It should be
added, on Mr. Hutchins's behalf, that he was more receptive to giving refuge in
this country to the victims of Nazi persecution than were many of his fellow-
citizens. It should also be added that, once the war started for us, Mr. Hutchins
made available facilities at the University of Chicago that were important for the
awesome development of the atomic bomb.)
It is sometimes said that the Second World War was made more likely because
of America's refusal to join the League of Nations. That is, it is said, we should
have listened to Woodrow Wilson in his campaign for the League of Nations.
But, it can also be said, this country had been too receptive to the Wilsonian
rhetoric that contributed substantially to American entry into the First World
War-and it was not long after that war that a profound disillusionment with
foreign interventions set in not only in the United States, but also in much of
Europe. (It has been noticed, by the way, that there is something Wilsonian, for
both good and ill, in our current campaign to democratize the Middle East.)
Critical to the anti-war opinion in much of Europe and in the United States in
the 1930s was the disaster that the First World War turned into. It did not take
long for sensible people everywhere to recognize that that war had been a dread-
ful folly which almost destroyed European civilization and which opened the
way to power for such tyrants as Stalin and Hitler.
The First World War was so dreadful, in fact, that it evidently made decent
people everywhere in the Western World much more reluctant than they should
have been to gear up for another major war in the 1930s.
VII
It remains to be seen, therefore, whether our current Iraqi Intervention will
eventually come to be regarded as our First World War and Vietnamese Interven-
tions have been. If that happens, salutary military interventions by the United
States during the coming decades may be much harder to promote than they
should be.
It also remains to be seen whether Israel comes to be held partly responsible in
this country, as it already seems to be in parts of Western Europe, for the way we
have conducted ourselves in the Middle East. Some will probably be inclined to
believe so if it should become harder and harder to understand why we conducted
ourselves there as we have. But it remains in our interest, as well as in the
interest of humanity generally, that Israel continue to be regarded by us as a
decent regime, even as a refreshing garden in that desert which is much of the
Middle East today.
The United States, if it is to thrive in the face of "terrorist" threats, needs the
goodwill and the informed and informing cooperation of peoples worldwide.
Particularly useful, for encouraging others to help us when and how they can, is a
steady display both of restraint and of confidence in facing the threats we do. (I
venture to mention, in passing, that we should be confident enough to treat oil as
another commodity on the world market, a vital commodity to be imported by us
just as essential food and medicines are imported by other countries.)
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A sense of proportion, in these matters, should help us respond with an in-
formed confidence to terrorism and to threats of terrorism. After all, it is hardly
likely that even the most devilish terrorists will ever be able to visit upon us the
devastation that hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes can. After all, also, it is sen-
sible to remind ourselves that we are mortal, which means that if one thing does
not "get us," something else certainly will.
C. The Unseemly Fearfulness of Our Time'"
I
A proper caution, particularly in the form of defensive measures, is to be en-
couraged in our affairs. We do tend to be enough aware of our mortality to take
precautions. Recklessness is certainly to be avoided.
There is provided in my 1971 treatise, The Constitutionalist, a detailed exami-
nation of principles vital to the American regime. 12 The sources and applications
of such principles are examined. Those principles, especially with respect to the
First Amendment guarantee of "freedom of speech [and] of the press," seemed to
be undermined because of desperate Cold War concerns in recent decades.
The apprehensiveness exhibited at times was hardly edifying. This is not to
deny the ferociousness of Stalinist regimes, in Russia and elsewhere, but there
were better and worse ways of responding to such threats. Particularly troubling
were the measures resorted to in this country that tended to make sensible re-
sponses less likely.
II
Our sometimes crippling Cold War responses went back, for important doctri-
nal justification, to Justice Oliver W. Holmes' ill-conceived opinion in 1919 for
the U.S. Supreme Court in Schenck v. United States. 13 His talk in Schenck about
such things as a "clear and present danger"' 4 was brought to bear on efforts to
justify the suppression during the Cold War of "conspiracies" and "subversion."
Since September 11, 2001, the campaign against "terrorism" and "Islamic fas-
cism" has sometimes looked for inspiration and authority to Cold War measures.
However misconceived some of our Cold War measures were, they at least
had in the Soviet Union a formidable adversary, or at least a potential adversary,
to contend with. An anticipation of our current misconceptions is indicated in
my first prepared remarks in response to the monstrous attacks of September
II These remarks, of November 10, 2005, were prepared for an Author Event presented by the
Seminary Cooperative Bookstore, Chicago, Illinois. The event was on the occasion of the publication, in
an enhanced edition, of GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST: NOTES ON THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (Lexington Books 2005).
12 GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST: NOTES ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT (Lexington
Books 2005).
13 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S 47 (1919).
14 Id. at 52.
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1 lth. Those remarks, of September 12th, addressed to a law school audience,
were entitled, "A Second Pearl Harbor? Let's Be Serious."
It was already evident that day, it seemed to me, that the worst damage we
would suffer in the months and years ahead would be self-inflicted. That has
certainly been true of the economic reversals endured by us. Even more serious
has been our moral, or spiritual, damage, illustrated by the campaign led in 2005
by the Vice President of the United States to block Congressional efforts to for-
bid American use (directly or by proxies) of torture, those restraining efforts led
in Congress by a Senator who had himself been tortured for several years by the
North Vietnamese.
III
It was obvious, in September 2001, that any regime that had permitted the
development of the September 11 th plot would have to go. It probably would
have been prudent to regard the resulting campaign in Afghanistan as primarily a
police action. This would have served as a sufficient warning to any regime
anywhere which might harbor criminal activities aimed at the United States.
Our anti-drugs campaigns in South America should remind us of the limits of
"nation-building" even by a great power. The obstacles in Afghanistan are even
more formidable, something that can be testified to by both the British and the
Russians after their experiences in that land during the past two centuries. Even
so, American casualties in Afghanistan have been far less than those in Iraq.
The longer we stay and suffer in Iraq, the harder it is to justify our Interven-
tion. The most that can be said for this enterprise is that it began as a sincere
invocation of Wilsonian idealism against a bloodthirsty tyrant. But as a defen-
sive measure on behalf of the United States, it has been a dubious undertaking,
not least because Iraq seems to have been turned (with our help) into a remarka-
bly productive breeding ground for suicidal "terrorists."
IV
Of course, if Iraq had truly been as powerful as we sometimes made it out to
be, we would never have invaded it. Our different responses to Iraq and to North
Korea (which is sometimes believed to possess nuclear weapons) instruct vulner-
able regimes worldwide as to the safety that may come with any publicized ac-
quisition of nuclear weapons. This is a lesson that the Iranians seem to have
taken to heart, along with what they see as an opportunity, because of the Ameri-
can Intervention in Iraq, to ally themselves as Shiites with the prospective Shiite
regime in that country.
The costs for the United States of the Iraqi Intervention continue to mount. It
soon required far more in lives, resources, and worldwide respect than was antici-
pated. Nor is it edifying to see the domestic apprehensiveness displayed by citi-
zens of the most powerful nation in the history of the world.
Such assessments do not excuse those, sick of soul, who planned and executed
the September 1 lth attacks, no matter what grievances they believed themselves
to have had against the United States. However crafty these attackers may have
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been, they did not seem to recognize how much they would undermine the stand-
ing of their cause among civilized peoples everywhere. Also, there may even be
survivors of the Taliban government in Afghanistan who recall warnings that
must have been given by some among them against allowing preparations on
their soil for a sneak attack on the United States.
V
Our primary concern in these matters should be with what has happened
among citizens of the United States. It has been far from becoming to have the
remarkably costly silliness we have seen in the measures devoted to domestic
security, measures that have sometimes been advocated with the use of a strategy
that seems to include the manipulation of scare tactics by those in authority.
Comfortable Americans have been encouraged to recognize their mortality in a
particularly corrosive manner.
We can be reminded, upon surveying these matters, of the limits of any politi-
cal regime, no matter how well-ordered it may be. Thus, I have argued, in the
concluding chapter of The Constitutionalist, that the dismal Cave depicted in
Book VII of Plato's Republic could be taken to represent even "the best regime"
(ruled by philosophers) described by Socrates in that dialogue. 15 That is, critical
to the limitations of any regime is the awareness that people generally do have of
their mortality, something which can make them apprehensive about anything
that seems to threaten their comfort, to say nothing of their very existence.
Even so, there are better and worse ways of responding to the dangers that we
are likely to encounter. Certainly, it is unbecoming to be as intimidated as we
sometimes appear to be, and as we are all too often stimulated to be, by the plots
of evil men. Clear thinking is the key to being able to recover from our mistakes
and to keep to a minimum our inevitable vulnerability as human beings.
VI
The analysis provided in The Constitutionalist of Cold War delusions can help
us assess what is being said and done these days. It is curious to see that some of
the people who were deceived by our Vietnamese delusions have lived long
enough to be taken in as well by rhetoric conjured up for the current Iraqi Inter-
vention. Unless one is a pacifist, a position that is very difficult to maintain in all
circumstances, one must be discriminating in how one responds to calls for
armed intervention by the United States.
Even when such intervention seems justified, or at least justifiable, there can
be, as in Korea in 1950, better and worse ways to conduct the necessary opera-
tions. On the other hand, passivity in the face of extreme provocation can be
demoralizing, as happened when American diplomatic personnel were held for
months as hostages by "revolutionaries" in Teheran. It would probably have
been more prudent, for the long run, if an ultimatum backed up by the prospects
of discriminating aerial bombardment had been issued by the United States gov-
15 ANASTAPLO, supra note 12, at 278.
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ernment, even if that course of action put at even greater risk the lives of the
hostages themselves, as well as the lives of innocent Iranians.
Miscalculations of risks can make a people less equipped than they could oth-
erwise be to deal with the serious challenges they do face. For example, it should
have been apparent, to any visitor to the Soviet Union in the 1960s, how weak
that country was, a recognition that should have encouraged us to be more sensi-
ble in preparing properly for how to deal with that country (with its vast store of
nuclear bombs and other weapons of mass destruction) once its regime collapsed.
The surprising thing about the Soviet Union was not that it collapsed when it did,
but rather that it somehow managed to survive as long as it did.
VII
It is not generally appreciated how much of a fluke the September 11 th "suc-
cesses" were. Any number of things could have gone "wrong," especially with
so many people involved in the plot. It was particularly remarkable that dozens
of conspirators should have been able to keep their rather complicated plans and
activities so secret for years, suggesting thereby the ethnic, ideological, and other
ties among them.
All of their plotting on that occasion depended on the expectation that they
could secure ready access to airliner cockpits, where they could convert airplanes
into manned missiles. Once airliner cockpits were substantially secured against
such takeovers by anyone using primitive weaponry, it was no longer possible to
plan as the September 1 1th perpetrators had done. This means, among other
things, that most, if not all, of the vast resources devoted to commercial airport
security in this country could be directed to far better uses, such as the detection
of so-called "suitcase dirty bombs" and the like.
Thus, a major concern among us should not be with the safety of commercial
airliners, however sobering it can be to have one or more of them destroyed by
explosives smuggled on board or by primitive missiles fired from the ground.
The costs of reducing completely, or almost completely, all the risks that may
chance to threaten us, are too great to be sensible. Here, as with many of our
stupendous Cold War expenditures and as with the considerable Iraq Intervention
costs, much better uses can be made of our resources, uses which would truly
strengthen us at home and which should earn us a useful respect abroad.
VIII
A recognition of an inevitable vulnerability can be salutary, a vulnerability
that accompanies human life itself and that may be deepened by the kind of life
we much prefer to have. After all, one man, acting alone, with, say, a rented
truck filled with readily available fertilizer, can easily kill several hundred peo-
ple. After all, also, natural catastrophes can suddenly kill tens of thousands of
people far less equipped than we are to respond with restorative measures when-
ever we are afflicted.
In short, it is worth repeating that what is needed by us is a Sense of Propor-
tion in assessing and responding to the dreadful things we are likely to encounter
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from time to time. Of course, such losses can seem even more threatening (as
well as offensive) when deliberately done to us by other human beings. But that
is no reason for serving the purposes of evil men by crippling ourselves, in an
even more destructive manner, by how we respond to the wickedness we
encounter.
The best defense, in the long run, is an informed awareness of our own virtue,
an awareness that is not paralyzed in its effectiveness by an unbecoming fearful-
ness. That the United States is still able, despite all its shortcomings, to attract
the rest of mankind is testified to by the efforts that have to be made by us to
keep out hordes of illegal immigrants. A properly informed, self-confident peo-
ple can be particularly effective in exposing, by precept and by example, the
wickedness and woeful ignorance that have to be reckoned with all over the
world.
Ix
It can be instructive to recall from time to time how the People of the United
States allowed themselves to be misdirected and misused as they were during the
Cold War. But it is also instructive to notice a critical difference "this time
around"-and that is the fact that the freedom to discuss and criticize govern-
mental measures remains substantially unabridged, except perhaps for some peo-
ple in this country identifiable as Middle Easterners. Vigorous criticisms can be,
and are, leveled against all aspects of the way we went to war in Iraq and of how
that Intervention and the subsequent Occupation have been conducted.
These criticisms can include observations about the scandalous unwillingness
of "the elites" who have taken us to war to devote either their sons or much of
their treasure to the current campaign. Criticisms at this time can even include
reminders of how some of our most "hawkish" leaders today were able to avoid
combat service during the Vietnam War, a dubious war that they and their fami-
lies were in favor of only if other people's sons were conscripted to fight it. So
long as such, and even more serious, criticisms can be made, the deeply-rooted
good sense of the American people can eventually be expected to assert itself
properly in assessing what is being done and why.
It is this type of good sense that can consider properly how human mortality is
to be understood. This consideration both encourages and permits us to identify
what kind of life is truly worth having and how it might best be secured. It is
thus, with a minimum of unbecoming fearfulness, that we can put to the best
possible use our natural desire for genuine self-preservation.
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D. The September 11th Challenge in Its Fifth Year: Does Anyone Have
a Plan? '6
The fifth-year anniversary of the September 1 Ith challenge found the People
of the United States in a troubled state of mind. The dire predictions of those
who had counseled against our 2003 Iraqi Intervention seemed to be coming true.
Those who had counseled against the Intervention as planned were, for the
most part, in two camps. Some had argued against any Intervention at all; others
had argued that, if an Intervention was undertaken, it would need three or four
times more military personnel devoted to it than had been planned.
Conditions in Iraq, at the five-year mark, do seem to be getting worse, or at
least our accomplishments there are easily lost sight of because of the frightful
daily slaughter by and of civilians. At the same time, it seems that the original
successes against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan have been steadily
undermined, perhaps because so much of our attention and effort has been di-
verted to Iraq.
Indicative of how troublesome Afghanistan, an always-restive region, has be-
come are the reports that heroin production there (for the world market) has now
reached record proportions, perhaps as much as 90% of the world's total produc-
tion. 17 This is at a time when the United States continues to prosecute, particu-
larly in South America, its "War on Drugs."
II
It now seems to be widely believed that our Administration, in conducting its
"War on Terror," has been remarkably incompetent. This assessment is heard
again and again, especially from critics of how the Occupation of Iraq has been
conducted.
The overwhelming military power of the United States could be seen at work
in the early stages of our operations both in Afghanistan and in Iraq. But it now
seems that the Administration should not have been as disdainful, as it once ap-
peared to be, of the cautions voiced by widely recognized experts familiar with
both the Middle East and Afghanistan.
Particularly difficult to deal with, it seems, is the ferocity, even the obscene
savagery, with which Iraqi factions are going at one another these days. It is now
open to debate how much the fierce passions exhibited daily in that "country"
preceded the decades-long atrocities of the Saddam Hussein regime.
Of course, it remains to be seen whether Iraq should continue to be regarded as
a single country. It must be apparent to the Kurds in that association that they
now have the best opportunity they may ever have to take charge of their own
16 These remarks, of September 11, 2006, were prepared for a meeting at the Loyola School of Law,
Chicago, Illinois. The preliminary publication of these remarks was in GREEK STAR, Oct. 19, 2006, at 8.
17 See, e.g., Carlotta Gall, Afghan Poppy Growing Reaches Record Level, U.N. Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 19, 2004, at A3.
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affairs after centuries of oppressive treatment by Iraqi Arabs, whether Sunni or
Shiite.
III
It now seems to be generally recognized that the threats to the United States
perceived before the invasion of Iraq were remarkably exaggerated by our Ad-
ministration. The only substantial debate here seems to be as to whether or not
those grievous misconceptions were knowingly promulgated by our leaders.
Thus, the issue of competence takes various forms. But the competence issue
affected our country in an unexpected way a year ago when it became obvious,
for all to see, that the National Administration could not deal reliably with the
massive challenges posed by Hurricane Katrina.
That is, the Administration suffered considerably from the general public per-
ception that it simply could not see what "everyone else" in the country (and
indeed worldwide) could see of what was happening on our Gulf Coast. This
perception strengthened the hand of those who had been insisting all along that
the Administration could not begin to grasp adequately what was happening half-
way around the world in Iraq and Afghanistan.
"Katrina" did for the Bush Administration what "Monica" had done for the
Clinton Administration. Credibility and trust, among the public at large, were
severely damaged.
IV
The damage here was compounded by the clumsy way that the Israeli incur-
sion into Lebanon during the summer of 2006 was handled by our State Depart-
ment. My Letter to Editors, of August 21, 2006 (reproduced here in its entirety)
commented on this matter:
We hear of an agonizing reappraisal, among Israelis these days, of how
and why their government conducted itself as it did during its recent Leb-
anese intervention. Critical to such a reappraisal should be an examina-
tion of why the Israeli government relied as much as it evidently did on
the American government in proceeding as it did in Lebanon. Why could
not the Israeli government see that it should, in dealing with Arabs, use
with considerable caution any military or political advice from a govern-
ment that has repeatedly shown itself so woefully incompetent in Iraq?
Thus, a series of misadventures, both at home and abroad, has evidently cre-
ated public unease with respect to the Bush Administration, however ineffectual
its political opponents have themselves sometimes seemed to be. But it is not
generally appreciated that still another misstep by the Bush Administration, in
full public view, may have been critical to its remarkable decline in public
esteem.
That misstep was the attempt by our President, with his allies in Congress, to
exploit the pathetic Terri Schiavo issue in March 2005. This fiasco culminated in
"the midnight flight" of the President from Texas to Washington in order to sign
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a bill that had been conjured up in Congress, thereby displaying to the country at
large how far shameless ideologues could go for an apparent political advantage,
no matter who might be hurt in the process.
That is, people generally seemed to sense that someone who had been diag-
nosed as in an irreversible vegetative state for more than a decade should not be
exploited in this way for what seemed to be political gain. It did not help the
Administration and its political allies when an autopsy, shortly thereafter, con-
firmed how badly damaged the brain of that exploited woman had long been.
V
In the summer of 2006 the homicide rate in the Iraqi civil strife hit three thou-
sand a month, reminding us of the number that had been slaughtered at the World
Trade Center in September 2001. This current carnage, it should be remembered,
is in a "country" one-tenth the size of the United States in population.
Something does seem to have gone dreadfully wrong in what we, not without
some altruistic yearnings, have undertaken to do in Iraq. And yet the Vice Presi-
dent of the United States could say about our Iraqi Intervention, during a Septem-
ber 10, 2006 television interview, "If we had to do it over again, we'd do exactly
the same thing."'18
Perhaps this insistence by the Vice President, who is known to have been a
vigorous advocate for the Iraqi Intervention, is supposed to be a commendable
display of determination and confidence. But it can appear instead to be a child-
ish insistence, suggesting to an exasperated public that "they still don't 'get it.'"
It remains to be seen how the emerging challenge of Iran in the Middle East is
to be dealt with. It does seem likely that the principal immediate beneficiary of
our Iraqi Intervention will be the Shiite Iranian regime, which is now likely to
have another Shiite regime as a neighbor in Iraq, something that the democrati-
cally-minded opponents to the dictatorial Ayatollahs in Iran will have to contend
with.
VI
It also remains to be seen how effectively we can redirect the tremendous
resources devoted to Homeland Security in this country. We can be reminded of
our misapprehensions here by the efforts we have already devoted to air-travel
security.
It should be noticed that the alleged anti-airliners plot exposed by the British
during the summer of 2006 was not detected by elaborate airport security mea-
sures. Rather, Intelligence efforts (that is, old-fashioned police work) seem to
have been relied upon.
All this should make us wonder whether it has been a mistake to believe that
the September 11 th attacks call for a "War on Terror," rather than for enhanced
police work, reinforced by ever more international cooperation. Intelligence ef-
18 Vice President Dick Cheney, Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast Sept. 10, 2006) available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060910.htm.
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forts are far more likely to be productive, with far less public apprehensiveness
stimulated, than much of what we are doing now, at airports and elsewhere (so
long as airliner cockpits are indeed secured against takeovers that can convert
airliners into manned missiles).
Far more important than our efforts to make air travel safer (while forty thou-
sand people continue to be killed annually on our highways) is the need to guard
against the equivalent of "suitcase dirty bombs." In short, hardheadedness is
needed in assessing risks and allocating resources.
VII
Systematic reassessments of what we are doing in response to the September
11 th atrocities are not likely to be developed, in our circumstances, until Con-
gress resumes its proper supervisory powers. This has perhaps begun with the
concern expressed recently by Members, including a few leading Republican
Senators, about the Administration's seeming eagerness to continue to torture
"enemy combatants."
Here, as elsewhere, a greater "Respect for the Opinions of Mankind" needs to
be exhibited by us. This can be particularly important both in discouraging the
bloodyminded and in exposing criminal "terror" plots.
A properly-guided world opinion can contribute significantly to the develop-
ment of a salutary understanding as to what simply should not be done. It is such
an understanding that an effective system of international law depends upon to do
what it, and only it, can do to make the world safer for civilized conduct.
Critical to all these developments, including a useful assessment of what we as
a nation have been saying and doing, is a reliance upon a proper sense of propor-
tion. Only then are we likely to conduct ourselves, both in word and in deed, like
the most powerful nation in the history of the human race.
E. Iraq and the 2006 Mid-term Congressional Elections 19
I
We observed yesterday the culmination of the Mid-term Congressional Elec-
tions campaigns that came to be regarded as a nationwide referendum on how the
Republican Party, both in the National Administration and in the Congress, has
handled our affairs, especially with respect to Iraq. Attempts had been made by
Republican leaders both to dramatize further "the War on Global Terrorism"
(with an emphasis on a concern for domestic security) and to extol the achieve-
ments of the Administration's economic policies. But Iraq has dominated the
news in recent months, especially with steady reports from Baghdad about the
daily wholesale murders (dozens at a time) of ferociously tortured Iraqi civilians,
regularly punctuated by assaults on American military personnel. Nor did it help
19 These remarks, of November 8, 2006, were prepared for an Author Event presented by the
Seminary Cooperative Bookstore, Chicago, Illinois. This was on the occasion of the publication of
George Anastaplo, Reflections on Constitutional Law (University Press of Kentucky 2006). The
preliminary publication of these remarks was in GREEK STAR, Oct. 19, 2006, at 8.
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Republican candidates to have reports out of Afghanistan these days which sug-
gest that the original 2001-2002 achievements there by the United States, di-
rectly in response to the September 11 th assaults, seem to have been sacrificed to
the determination of our Administration to devote the bulk of our military efforts
abroad since 2003 to Iraq, a decision which some analysts have called the great-
est strategic blunder in American history. (I suggest, in passing, that it can seem
odd to hear an Administration tout itself as superior to its political opponents on
"domestic security against terrorists" when it was on its watch that the infamous
September 11 th attacks took place.)
President Bush, in the opening statement for his news conference of October
25, 2006, assessed in this fashion the current situation in Iraq:
The events of the past month have been a serious concern to me and a
serious concern to the American people.... The enemy we face in Iraq
has evolved over the past three years. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, a
sophisticated and violent insurgency took root .... We learned some key
lessons from that early phase in the war. We saw how quickly Al Qaeda
and other extremist groups would come to Iraq to fight and try to drive us
out. We overestimated the capability of the civil service in Iraq to con-
tinue to provide essential services to the Iraqi people. We did not expect
the Iraqi Army, including the Republican Guard, to melt away in the way
that it did in the face of advancing Coalition forces.20
Even so, the President singled out accomplishments that (he said) portend well
for the future of our efforts in Iraq, continuing his news conference remarks in
this way:
Despite these early setbacks, some very important progress was made in
the midst of an incredibly violent period. Iraqis formed an interim gov-
ernment that assumed sovereignty. The people elected a transitional gov-
ernment, drafted and adopted the most progressive democratic
constitution in the Arab world, braved the car bombs and assassins to
choose a permanent government under that constitution, and slowly be-
gan to build a capable national army. Al Qaeda and insurgents were una-
ble to stop this program .... In an intercepted letter to Osama bin Laden,
the terrorist Zarqawi laid out his strategy to drag Iraq's Shia population
into a sectarian war .... The cycle of violence in which Al Qaeda insur-
gents attack Shia civilians and Shia death squads retaliate against Sunnis
has sharply increased in recent months, particularly in Baghdad. As the
enemy shifts tactics, we are shifting tactics as well. 21
It is far from clear, if it ever was clear, who "the enemy" is these days.
An instructive assessment of the overall Administration strategy was provided
last week by a journalist who had originally endorsed our Iraqi Intervention:
20 President Bush, Press Conference on October 25, 2006, in In Opening Remarks, President Urges
Steadfastness in a Difficult Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2006, at A12.
21 Id.
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I supported the removal of Saddam Hussein. I believed that Arabs de-
served a chance to build a rule-of-law democracy in the Middle East .... I
still believe that our removal of Hussein was a noble act. I only wish the
[Bush] Administration had done it competently .... Yet, for all our errors,
we did give the Iraqis a unique chance to build a rule-of-law democracy.
They preferred to indulge in old hatreds, [sectarian] violence, ethnic big-
otry, and a culture of corruption. It appears that the cynics were right.
Arab societies can't support democracy as we know it. And people get
the government they deserve. For us, Iraq's impending failure is an em-
barrassment. For the Iraqis-and other Arabs-it's a disaster the dimen-
sions of which they do not yet comprehend. They're gleeful at the
prospect of America's humiliation. But it's their tragedy, not ours. Iraq
was the Arab world's last chance to board the train to modernity, to give
the region a future, not just a bitter past .... Iraq could have turned out
differently. It didn't. And we must be honest about it. We owe that
much to our troops. They don't face the mere forfeiture of a few Con-
gressional seats but [rather] the loss of their lives. Our military is now
being employed for political purposes. That's unworthy of our nation. 22
The assessment just quoted seems to suggest that things might have turned out
much better in Iraq if the Administration had been more competent in pursuit of
its worthy objective. A quite different approach has been taken by a distin-
guished sociologist in his weekly column on the Friday before the Mid-term Con-
gressional Elections (compare the grim predictions in his column of October 13,
2006):
Why did we invade Iraq in the first place? We no longer hear that Iraq
had weapons of mass destruction aimed at us. Or that, as Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice put it, the invasion was the "right thing to do."
Or that the goal is to make Iraq safe for democracy. Or that we must fight
to the end to preserve the honor of those who have died. ... My hunch is
that the answer can be found in the President's words when he was told
about the [September 1 lth] attack: "This is war!" In point of fact, it was
not. It was a vicious assault by a gang of international criminals, not a
war in any sense that the word has traditionally meant. The President's
spontaneous eagerness to find a war where there was only a terrible crime
marked the genesis of such phrases as "war on terror," "war on global
terror," and "war on Islamo-fascism." . . . Unfortunately, after the quick
clean up of Afghanistan (as we thought then), there was no war around.
Bush needed a war-another quick, easy victory that would eliminate any
discussion of the possibly stolen 2000 election. Whatever the motives of
the other chicken-hawks, like the neo-cons who wanted to go to "Jerusa-
lem through Baghdad," ultimately the reason for the invasion of Iraq was
that the President at some level of his personality wanted a war, needed a
war. He also wanted and needed an enemy, and Saddam Hussein was the
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ideal enemy.... I do not question the President's sincerity. He undoubt-
edly persuaded himself that war was what God wanted him to do.... The
war has become the main issue in the election. Americans will vote
Tuesday on whether they support the war or oppose it. Have they come
to realize that it is [for the President] a vanity war, or do they still want
revenge on terrorists and are they still afraid?23
A more dispassionate view of these matters seems to be provided by the pro-
Iraq War British journal, The Economist, which opened a recent editorial in this
way:
When a great democracy such as the United States holds elections at a
time of war, voters are torn between two instincts. One is to show grit
and solidarity by rallying around the flag and the President. The other is
to treat the election as a referendum on the war. Ever since September
1lth, 2001 George Bush has milked the first instinct for all it is worth.
But having gained so much from presenting himself as a war President,
Mr. Bush can hardly complain now that the voters are moving in the other
direction. Many seem intent on using the November mid-terms to give
their verdict on his handling of the war in Iraq. That is bad news for the
Republicans. According to a Gallup poll this week, only 19% of Ameri-
cans still think that America is winning. In Britain, America's chief ally
in Iraq, the disenchantment is deeper. [One] poll this week found that
45% of Britons wanted their troops to leave at once, and a further 16%
wanted them out by the end of the year .... This loss of faith among the
people of Britain and America is easy to understand. They have already
shown a lot of patience. More than three years after the overthrow of
Saddam Hussein, Iraq has become progressively more violent. Some
2,200 American soldiers and 120 British ones have been killed, and the
death toll among Iraqis may stretch into the hundreds of thousands.24
Even so, the Economist editors felt obliged to caution against the Coalition's
giving up in Iraq at this time:
For the politicians (and newspapers like ours) who argued strongly for the
invasion of Iraq, it is no longer enough to accuse those who want to head
for the exit of "cutting and running," as if using a pejorative phrase set-
tled the argument either way. Cutting your losses is sometimes the sensi-
ble thing to do, even for a superpower, and even after paying a heavy
price in lost lives and wasted money. If you genuinely believe, as many
people now do, that the likeliest long-term outcome in Iraq is that
America will end up cutting and running anyway, with no improvement
to be expected even three or four years hence, why simply postpone the
inevitable? Because [it can be argued] failure may not be inevitable. It is
true that Iraq is not poised to become the exemplary democracy the
23 Andrew Greeley, U.S. is casualty in Bush's Vanity War, CHI. SUN TIMES, Nov. 3, 2006, at 37.
24 Cut and Run?, EcONOMIST, Oct. 26, 2006, at 15.
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American neocons dreamed of carving out in the heart of the Arab world.
But that definition of success was always a peculiar one to apply to a war
the United States launched primarily to secure its own interests .... The
question Americans need to ask is what impact their own staying or going
is likely to have on the balance of probable outcomes. And in answering
this question, the case for staying becomes a good deal stronger. 25
The Economist editors conclude, therefore, with this counsel:
Leaving now stands a fair chance of plunging Iraq into an enlarged war
and a far bigger bloodbath than anything seen so far. For Mr. Bush, the
Iraq war has in one sense already been lost, whatever result the mid-terms
bring. This President's legacy will forever be tainted by what he over-
promised and how much he underperformed. The voters of America are
entitled to judge and punish his party as they see fit. But Americans
would be wrong to extend this punishment to the people of Iraq, who
have suffered so much already. Even if it was a mistake to blunder into
Iraq, it would be a bigger mistake, bordering on a crime, for a nation that
aspires to greatness to blunder out now, without first having exhausted
every possible effort to put Iraq back together and avert a wider war.26
This is probably as hopeful an account of American prospects in Iraq as is
available at this time from sober observers somewhat familiar with the region.
Most such observers, it seems to me, expect conditions in Iraq to continue to
deteriorate so long as something that can be considered by many Iraqis as an
"Occupation" continues, a deterioration that evidently has precedents in how
other Western incursions have been responded to in Iraq during the past century
and a half. Many observers do expect the deterioration triggered by our Interven-
tion to get even worse when Coalition forces finally do have to leave Iraq. 27
II
It is apparent, this day after yesterday's Mid-term Congressional Elections,
that Democrats will assume control of the House of Representatives in January,
2007. It remains to be seen whether they can confirm as well the control of the
Senate that they seem to have won. That depends on the final resolution of the
contest in Virginia, where the Democratic candidate leads after the first count.
However that may turn out, Democratic opportunities to take more Republican-
held Senate seats could well be even greater in 2008 than they were this time.
Besides, during the next two years, all Senators (whether or not up for reelection
next time) will want to study the election returns this time around and conduct
themselves accordingly, especially with respect to the war in Iraq and to recent
deficit spending.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 For an analysis in the spirit of the ECONOMIST editorial that has been quoted, see Fareed Zakaria,
Rethinking Iraq, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 6, 2006, at 26.
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The critical question for months has been about who would control which
House in Washington in January 2007. Citizens familiar with our Constitutional-
ism know that such control is reflected in the funding that is legislated and in its
accompanying conditions. Perhaps even more critical may be the uses likely to
be made of the oversight powers available to Congress. Congressional investiga-
tions, especially with respect both to how the Iraqi Intervention was originally
justified and prepared for and to how financial and other resources devoted to it
have been used-such investigations, if properly conducted, should illuminate
what it now seems sensible for us to try to do in and with Iraq. All this may
affect as well the 2008 Presidential Election, something that can also be affected
by the increase in the number of Democratic Governors following upon the 2006
elections.
Underlying the political maneuvering we are familiar with are deeper-rooted
developments that affect surface manifestations. The outcome of yesterday's
Mid-term Congressional Elections was dramatically forecast for me personally
during a telephone call I received from a prominent pro-Israel Reaganite Repub-
lican two months ago. He evidently considered the National Administration to
have made a hopeless mess of things in the Middle East. At the root of the
Administration's problems, he lamented, were naive opinions held by various
influential Neo-Conservatives about how a reliable constitutional system is estab-
lished and maintained.
III
This was, yesterday, a November 7th election, the first on that very date since
the 2000 Presidential Election. Critical to that election was what the United
States Supreme Court did in "deciding" it. Particularly troubling, for the Consti-
tutionalist, was the apparent unwillingness of a majority of that Court to allow
the Presidential election process to develop as prescribed by the Constitution.
That is, it was up to the House of Representatives (a Republican-controlled
House), and not the Supreme Court, to resolve whatever questions remained after
Florida, along with the other States, had submitted its electoral results to
Congress.
The insecurity of the Bush Administration, especially since it did seem that
more citizens had gone to the polls in Florida (as well as nationwide) intending to
vote for Al Gore than to vote for George W. Bush-this insecurity may even
have affected how the September l1th atrocities were responded to by our
government.
Some of us, no doubt, were heartened by the show of official outrage and
determination in response to the September 1lth challenge. But there are better
and worse ways to display one's passions. Consider what merit, if any, there
may be to the judgment pronounced last Friday evening (on the News Hour with
Jim Lehrer) by a Democratic Party partisan, Mark Shields:
George Bush says, "Words have consequences." George Bush said that.
This is a man who, with his false braggadocio and his swaggering macho,
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stood up and probably put more American troops in danger with a taunt to
the insurgents of "Bring 'em on."'2 8
The unfortunate insensitivity attributed to the President here and elsewhere can
be said to have been anticipated by the insensitivity he had repeatedly exhibited,
as Governor of Texas, to the parade of executions over which he blithely
presided.
IV
A fundamental problem with the way the so-called "War on Global Terrorism"
has been conducted is with respect to the Sense of Proportion that is called for in
the effective use both of constitutional processes and of national resources (spiri-
tual as well as material). It is odd that so much has been invested by us in Iraq, a
"country" that could initially be overrun by our Coalition in a few weeks and
with very few casualties.
We have, in the way we have proceeded, displayed the lack of a feel for the
history of the Middle East and its volatility. The fragmentation of that "country"
is anticipated by the autonomy that its Kurds (as non-Arabic Muslims) are al-
ready developing for themselves in Northern Iraq. (It is not inconceivable that
any "permanent" American bases in that region would be in "Kurdistan," serving
thereby both to discourage incursions from Turkey, Syria, and Iran, and to police
"terrorist" exports from the rest of Iraq.)
Even more dangerous than what we have done in Iraq has been our insensitiv-
ity to Islamic passions worldwide. An American Administration that has made
much of "faith-based initiatives" sometimes seems blissfully unaware of how
other peoples are moved by their own faiths. It is further curious that such an
Administration in this country should have initiated developments in Iraq which
have led to a steady decline in the Christian population in Iraq.
A Sense of Proportion is to be contrasted to that Arrogance of Power, which is
apt to be developed and displayed whenever our National Government happens
to be dominated for years at a time by one or another political faction among us.
One consequence of such a display this time around has been the considerable
alienation by the United States of international goodwill. Such goodwill is essen-
tial for a useful reliance by us on the law of nations and on day-to-day diplo-
macy, both of which are essential for suppressing the criminal activity and the
perverse exhibitionism that we have imprudently dramatized as "global terror-
ism." The salutary repudiation of the Bush Administration recorded yesterday in
our Mid-term Congressional Elections could help assure troubled people every-
where that the American people are more sensible than their Government-and
that could help restore a useful goodwill worldwide with respect to this country.
28 Mark Shields, The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast Nov. 3, 2006) available
at http://www.pbs.org/newshourlbb/politics/july-decO6/sbl 1-03.html.
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V
Our attack in 2001 on Afghanistan was inevitable (with considerable support
among decent peoples everywhere), once it was determined that the September
11 th assaults had been deliberately developed there. The Iraqi Intervention, on
the other hand, has been widely condemned, in this country and even more
abroad, as a "War of Choice." The judgment of those who had endorsed such a
war is bound to remain suspect.
Our realists can remind us that critical to our interest in Iraq and its neighbors
is our dependence on Middle Eastern oil. One way of putting the long-term
problem here, however, is to suggest that our oil is probably much under priced.
This is evident as one rides a bus down the Outer Drive to the Chicago Loop:
one can see that more than three-quarters of the automobiles which clog Chicago
streets carry only their drivers. A better (and healthier) use by us (and by others)
of oil and of alternative energy sources would probably be encouraged if the
price of oil were to be much higher than it now is in the world market. (Of
course, the economist might want to figure into the cost of the oil we presently
import the considerable military-related expenditures we make to secure our oil
supplies.)
But for the vast oil pools underlying the Middle East, we probably would not
have the sometimes obsessive interest we have had for decades in that part of the
world. (It can be sobering to consider what could have been done, with one-tenth
of the resources already devoted by us to Iraq, to suppress recent genocidal im-
pulses in Africa and elsewhere.) The Middle East includes, of course, Iran, a
country that we were at times so concerned about during recent decades that we
seemed to encourage Saddam Hussein to help us "contain" it.
The Iranian leaders, evidently taking their cue from the North Koreans, seem
to have learned that one way to discourage such an American Intervention as that
currently seen in Iraq is to appear to have nuclear weapons. Illustrative of the
general incompetence that has come to be associated by observers with the Bush
Administration is (as we have noticed) that it is likely that the principal short-
term beneficiary of the mess that has been made in Iraq will be the current Ira-
nian dictators. This, too, was predicted by some critics of what our "hawks" very
much wanted to do in Iraq once Afghanistan had been "settled." Already there
seem to be in Southern Iraq Iranian-sponsored theocratic enclaves.
VI
Thus, the incompetence of the Bush Administration has been displayed both at
home and abroad. The public at large somehow came to sense that its fearfulness
was being deliberately exploited by "patriots" who were neither thoughtful nor
candid about what was going on. And the public has also begun to suspect that
there is something demeaning about such constant exploitation of its anxieties.
But why, it can still be wondered, has the Administration been as incompetent
as it has been in dealing with one emergency after another? One can suspect that
this has something to do with the fact that so many of the Administration's most
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influential ideologues do not really "believe in" government. Such a belief may
be essential if a constitutional system is to work efficiently.
Even more puzzling may be the way that Tony Blair allowed himself (against
the decided opinion not only of his country but also of his own party) to get as
close as he did to George W. Bush on Iraq. Did he, too, underestimate what
would be needed for an enduring success in Iraq? Do we see in both of these
leaders the risks of an evangelical fervor in politics, something that was exploited
by Woodrow Wilson in promoting American involvement in that catastrophic
folly known as the First World War?
However that may be, the equivalent of the repudiation of the President regis-
tered yesterday by our Mid-term Congressional Elections may be seen in what
the Labour Party has had to do to what had been the remarkable career of its
Prime Minister. 29
VII
My analysis on this occasion should be accompanied by a caution: it is not
unusual that there should be a drop in support of the dominant political party
registered by the public at the Mid-term Congressional Elections during a Presi-
dent's second term. We can even be reminded of the repudiation of Winston
Churchill once victory over Germany had been secured during the Second World
War.
Thus, it is not the decline of support for the Administration that was signifi-
cant yesterday, but rather the issue somehow identified by the public as critical.
Don Erler, a solidly conservative pundit in Fort Worth, can speak (in a pre-Elec-
tions column) of "the Iraqi debacle." He quotes "one woman, typical of millions,
[as saying] that she would vote for 'Happy the Clown' if that represents 'a vote
against the powers that put us in [Iraq]." 30
The primary concern in this country has been, it seems, the cost in American
lives and treasure required for our Iraqi Intervention. But the "debacle" extends
beyond American sacrifices, sobering though they are (especially as they now
approach the number of New Yorkers murdered at the World Trade Center on
September 11, 2001). The published estimates of Iraqi dead as "a result of the
war" range from thirty thousand to several hundred thousand-and this in a pop-
ulation one-tenth the size of ours. It is understandable why so many Iraqis com-
plain (however mistakenly) that conditions are worse now than they were even
during the tyranny of Saddam Hussein. The dismal conditions in Iraq these days
are reflected in the hordes (evidently in the hundreds of thousands) who have fled
the "country" for sanctuary elsewhere. We should not be surprised to learn that
Iraq has now become a training camp for "terrorists" who are eager to strike out
at American interests elsewhere, something more readily accomplished by them
29 See, e.g., Who Killed the British Prime Minister?, EcONOMIST, Sept. 16, 2006, at 32 ("Mr. Blair
may believe it is still too early to judge the success of what is being attempted in Iraq, but his party holds
him personally responsible for what many regard as the greatest debacle in British foreign policy since
Suez, 50 years ago").
30 Don Erler, It all Comes Down to. FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Oct. 31, 2006, at B 11.
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now that the United States has alienated world opinion as much as it evidently
has and thus undermined Intelligence and other institutional cooperation among
nations by its arrogant unilateralism. Indeed, the more thoughtlessly we conduct
ourselves now, the more understandable, in the eyes of the unsophisticated and
the resentful, the atrocities of September 11, 2001 may become.
It can be hoped that the evident public repudiation of our Iraq policy said to be
represented by our 2006 Mid-term Congressional Elections will encourage a sen-
sible reassessment in Washington, by both Democrats and Republicans, of how
we are conducting ourselves. Somehow or other, we are going to get out of Iraq,
with an exception made perhaps for "Kurdistan" (which is both secular and pro-
Western in its orientation, somewhat as Israel is, still another people worthy of
both sensible support and useful restraint by us). Some day, a Texas-born Demo-
crat observed this morning, the American people will recognize that Osama bin
Laden should not be conducting our affairs. After all (it was also observed), he is
a deluded man surrounded by fanatics, hiding in a cave, spiritually as well as
physically. We certainly should not continue to allow ourselves to be trapped
with him in such a cave. It should be evident that we have begun to emerge into
the light of an old-fashioned Constitutionalism when our government respects
once again the full scope of the venerable writ of habeas corpus, even on behalf
of so-called "enemy combatants," held by us for years at a time without proper
hearings. 31
Constitutionalism may be seen as well in that restoration of Congressional
oversight of Executive initiatives which seems to have been authorized by yester-
day's Mid-term Congressional Elections. The President conceded, in a statement
today, "It's clear the Democrat [sic] Party had a good night." Corrections are
needed here as elsewhere in the Presidential assessment of things: it was "a good
night" not only for the Democratic Party but even more for the People of the
United States and their Constitution.
Conclusion
A politically-bipartisan Iraq Study Group issued in December 2006 its long-
awaited Report, ratifying thereby the general assessment by the American public
that the ideologues-led involvement by the United States in Iraq since 2003 is in
need of serious reconsideration. The Administration's response to recent devel-
opments, and especially to the 2006 Mid-term Congressional Elections, featured
President Bush's justification on January 10, 2007 of an addition by some twenty
thousand American soldiers to the forces we already have in Iraq.
All this is at a time when our Coalition partners, especially Great Britain, are
preparing to reduce their troop levels in Iraq, and at a time when it does appear
that the principal short-term beneficiaries because of our Intervention in Iraq will
be the theocratic dictatorship in Iran and the Taliban in Afghanistan. It is also at
a time when we have yet to assess properly the considerable human costs of the
31 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Rule of Law: Produce the Body, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 2006, at A7.
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sanctions imposed on Iraq between the Gulf War of 1991 and the Iraqi Interven-
tion of 2003.
Conservative Republicans have joined indignant Democrats in expressing dis-
may at the addict-like recourse by our Administration to "more of the same in
Iraq." Troubled Republicans have been represented, most dramatically, by a Ne-
braska Senator who protested on January 11, 2007, "I have to say... that I think
[the] speech given last night by [the] President represents the most dangerous
foreign policy blunder in this country since Vietnam."
This comment recognizes, in effect, that a Republican Administration is now
attempting to match in the Middle East the Vietnamese follies which a Demo-
cratic Administration (also without due regard for world opinion) had staged
forty years ago in Southeast Asia. It should be recognized as well that the re-
markable incompetence displayed by our current Administration in dealing with
Iraq has been exceeded only by the incompetence of the September 11 th perpe-
trators, with both "teams" unable to anticipate how adverse an effect their cam-
paigns would have worldwide on their respective causes.
It is likely that vigorous Congressional oversight efforts in 2007 will expose
numerous questionable actions by the Administration, including the shameless
mishandling of billions of dollars-questionable actions both in Iraq and in Af-
ghanistan. It is to be hoped that such revelations will eventually contribute not
only to a revived respect for international law in this country but also to the
recognition that our Congress was intended by the Framers of the Constitution to
be the ultimately dominant Branch of the Government of the United States.
Whatever may be considered by us at this time, it can be hoped that the United
States will, one way or another, begin to withdraw from what is now known as
Iraq. Troubled governments in the Middle East will be inclined (preferably after
a proper regional conference) to settle for, if not even to encourage, a takeover
thereafter of that fevered "country" by a sensible Iraqi military faction which is
appalled by the ferocity there of sectarian violence and which is determined to
exhibit the nobler elements of Islam.
It remains to be seen whether the United States will be invited to stay indefi-
nitely in what turns out to be Kurdistan. It can be hoped, if not even expected,
once the increasingly provocative American "Occupation" ends, that those who
do take charge in Iraq will consider it very much in their interest to suppress
"terrorists" tempted to use any part of the Iraqi federation, as Afghanistan is said
to have been used before September 2001, to prepare sneak attacks upon the
United States or its friends by ideologues of a different stripe from our own.
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